

2 February 1954

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant for Intelligence
Department of State
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
United States Air Force
Director of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
Deputy Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff
Assistant to the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Control of Dissemination and Use of
Intelligence and Intelligence Information

PROBLEM:

1. To clarify and standardize among the IAC agencies the various controls on dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information other than internal agency controls and special controls on special and atomic intelligence, information subject to copyright, libel, slander and communication laws or unclassified material published for non-governmental use; and to recommend an appropriate means to accomplish this objective.

DISCUSSION:

2. At present throughout the IAC community there are various control devices used in restricting the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information. Existing control devices include such stamps as "U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY" (used by State and CIA); "SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force); "LIMITED DISTRIBUTION" (used by CIA); "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" (as used by several agencies in the field); "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" (as used by the State Department in Washington); two stamps used by CIA/CS in controlling information, one for critical security reasons and the other for

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operational or administrative reasons; a limiting stamp or caveat used by CIA/OO on another series of information which restricts the dissemination of that information to IAC components and a caveat

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in CIA regulations, applicable only within this Agency, which govern the use of raw information in finished intelligence in order to protect sources and methods of intelligence. There are also bilateral agreements between a part of this Agency and other agencies which limit the use of information, for example: OO has required the State Department, in writing, not to disseminate [REDACTED] reports overseas. Further, there have been efforts made in response to particular problems to educate recipients of intelligence and intelligence information on the controls which should be exercised and a temporary arrangement is in effect between this Agency and G-2 with respect to the certain uses which may be made by G-2 of this Agency's material.

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3. The above description of the present system does not pretend to be an exhaustive explanation of existing practices but rather outlines the number of stamps and other mechanisms in existence to achieve control over the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information. Several questions have come to the attention of this Office with respect to existing controls. Some of these questions are as follows:

a. Are the two stamps, one utilized by the three services and the other by State and CIA (SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS and U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY), designed to accomplish the same purpose?

b. Are part-time employees, external research personnel, consultants, aliens employed by the U.S. Government or foreign officers integrated into G-2 considered U.S. officials for the purpose of dissemination, under "U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY" or "SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS?"

c. Is it necessary and desirable to have two "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" stamps, one for use in the field and one for use in Washington, using the same words but designed for entirely different purposes?

d. Can material be released to non-IAC agencies which does not bear the caveat used at present by CIA/OO?

e. How is controlled information cited in finished intelligence?

f. Which information series require the deletion of source references and which do not when used in finished intelligence?

g. When controlled information is used in a finished intelligence product to what extent must that product be similarly controlled?

h. How does an analyst recognize information, the very substance of which should not be placed in finished intelligence products?

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4. After examining present practices and taking advantage of our own experience and that of the collectors, producers, and disseminators in CIA, we have come up with a proposed DCID to standardize control practices in the community (TAB A). Early in the year we discussed this question very informally with the State Department and the services and were impressed that we would receive their full cooperation in this effort. For example: The State Department then and recently advises us that it would be most desirable, from their point of view, to have specific guidance in the use of our material. Likewise, G-2 three or four times this year, has stated the same desire to us.

RECOMMENDATION:

5. That your representatives discuss the attached draft DCID with this Office before its formal submission to the IAC for concurrence.

JAMES Q. REBER
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Intelligence Coordination